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Abstract 
In spite of the growing consensus of the need to utilise military expenditure to help combat 
terrorism, our understanding of the threshold at which military expenditure reduces the effect 
of terrorism stemming from capital flight remains largely underexplored. We employed a 
panel data of 37 African countries from 1996-2010  and determined that the thresholds are 
apparent exclusively in Quantile Regressions with military expenditure thresholds ranging 
from:  4.224 to 5.612 for domestic terrorism, 5.734 to 7.363 for unclear terrorism and 4.710 
to 6.617 for total terrorism. No thresholds are apparent in transnational terrorism related 
regressions. Depending on the terrorist target, the findings broadly show that a critical mass 
of between 4.224 and 7.363 of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP is needed to 
reverse the effects of terrorism stemming from capital flight. Implications for public policy 
are discussed.  
JEL Classification: C50; D74; F23; N40; O55. 
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1. Introduction 
Accompanying the growth of the offshore financial economy which emerged in the 1950s is 
capital flight to tax havens with some resources being diverted to fund terrorism (Christensen, 
2011; Asongu, Tchamyou & Tchamyou, 2016). In the last three decades, the issue of capital 
flight to and from the developing world and the potential effects in fostering terrorism has 
increasingly garnered attention of policy-makers and academics (Asongu, et al., 2016; GTI, 
2014). In the wake of increasing incidences of terrorism, many governments around the globe 
have directed considerably resources toward combating global terrorism by halting their 
sources of finance (Czinkota, Knight, Liesch & Steen, 2010).  Some governments’ 
counterterrorism efforts are directed towards the use of the military to tackle the problem 
(Koh, 2007; Czinkota et al., 2010). At the same time, a body of research has suggested that 
military spending does not necessarily reduce terrorism (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010).  
Notwithstanding the growing stream of research on capital flight (Asongu, 2014) and 
terrorism (Czinkota et al., 2010), the literature remains unclear about the thresholds at which 
military expenditure can reduce the effect of terrorism stemming from capital flight. Against 
this backdrop, our main purpose is to assess thresholds at which military expenditure reduces 
the effects of terrorism stemming from capital flight. In essence, we assess military spending 
thresholds at which capital flight for terrorism can be mitigated by military spending. The 
notion of threshold is in accordance with the critical mass theory or minimum requirement in 
a policy variable before positive or negative effects on an outcome variable can be 
established (Batuo, 2015). Hence, the notion of threshold is consistent with conditions for 
Kuznets and U shapes (Ashraf & Galor, 2013).  
We focus on Africa to shed light on the subject. First of all, Africa is major the source 
of substantial capital flight which has escalated over the past few decades (Asongu, 2014). 
For instance, thirty-three countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) lost a total of 814 billion US 
Dollars (in constant of 2010 US Dollars) between 1970 and 2010 (Boyce & Ndikumana, 
2012a).  Indeed, the amount lost to capital flight is higher than foreign direct investment and 
official development assistance of respectively 306 and 659 billion US Dollars received by 
these countries in SSA during the same period. It has been suggested that a fundamental 
impediment to the development in Africa is the shortage of financing (see Boyce & 
Ndikumana, 2012a).  Lack of finance has hindered public investment required to alleviate 
extreme poverty and enhance social service delivery. Indeed, a recent World Bank report on 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) revealed that extreme poverty 
has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of Africa (World Bank, 
2015).  
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Second, whereas terrorism is not a particularly new phenomenon in Africa, the trend 
at which it is increasing represents a growing policy concern (see Alfa-Wali et al., 2015). For 
instance, a recent report on the Global Terrorism Index (GTI, 2014) has shown that compared 
to the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) which was responsible for 6, 073 deaths, the 
Boko Haram of Nigeria accounted for about 6,644 deaths. Other notable terrorist movements 
on the continent include: Ansar Al-Shariya in Tunisia; Ansar Dine, led by Iyad Ag Ghaly 
who was a former close ally of Gaddafi; Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; Al-Shabaab of 
Somalia and the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Mulathameen Brigade that is headed by Mokhtar 
Belmokhtar. Notable recent examples of terrorism include:  (i) the 2013 Westgate shopping 
mall and 2015 Garissa University attacks by the Somali Al-Shabaab in Kenya; (ii) the 2015 
Bardo National Museum and Sousse attacks in Tunisia; (iii) November 2015 Sinai Russian 
plane crash and Radison Blu Hotel attacks respectively in Egypt and Mali and (iv) Boko 
Haram of Nigeria extending its sphere of terrorism to neighbouring countries like Chad, 
Cameroon and Niger (Efobi & Asongu, 2016).  
Our study offers several contributions to research on capital flight and terrorism. First, 
the existing literature is conflicting on the effects of military spending in dampening 
terrorism. Indeed, there is no consensus in theoretical and empirical literature on whether 
military expenditure has a positive or negative effect on terrorism (see Feridum and Shahbaz, 
2010). We integrate insights from the literatures on terrorism and capital flight to fill this gap 
in our understanding by determining the thresholds at which military expenditure reduces the 
effects of terrorism stemming from capital flight.  Second, although a substantial body of 
empirical literature has focused on the relationship between violence and capital flight (see 
Nyatepe-Coo, 1994; Hermes & Lensink, 2001; Lensink et al., 2000; Fielding, 2004; Le & 
Zak, 2006), the dimension of terrorism has remain underexplored. While much focus in the 
literature is on the Middle East and pockets of terrorism incidents in Europe, the African 
continent is receiving less scholarly attention, despite growing Islamic fundamentalism and 
radicalisation (see Fazel, 2013; Clavarino, 2014).  
The rest of the study is structured as follows. In Section 2, the theoretical 
underpinnings and related literature are examined. Section 3 examines the data and 
methodology. The results are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 outlines 
implications and future research directions.   
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2. Intuition, theoretical underpinnings and related literature 
2.1 Linkage between terrorism and capital flight  
By terrorism, we are referring to “the premeditated, systematic threat or use of violence by 
subnational groups to attain a political, religious, or ideological objective through 
intimidation of a large audience” (Czinkota et al., 2010, p. 828). Terrorism is very likely to be 
connected to the flight of capital because it produces an uncertain economic outlook which 
discourages investors from investing within an economy. This intuition is consistent with the 
evidence that investors prefer investing in economic environments that are stable (see Le 
Roux & Kelsey, 2016; Kelsey & Le Roux, 2016). Accordingly, terrorism inflicts substantial 
economic damages that affect investors’ concerns about asset valuation as well as loss of 
confidence owing to poor economic outlook. Therefore, assets and money could quickly 
flow-out of a country in the face of terrorism. Indeed, some studies have indicated a link 
between terrorism and decline in international investment (Blomberg & Hess, 2006). 
Political access theories (see Eyerman, 1998) argue that terrorism is connected with 
more political instability compared to political stability. Along this line of research, the link 
between capital flight and terrorism can be understood from how violence affects the 
movement of capital from a country. Therefore, the capital stock in countries is likely to 
reduce in situations of political instability because conflicts are highly linked with uncertainty 
in the future return of investments. Ultimately, domestic investors are obliged to divert their 
capital abroad in order to secure certain returns (Davies, 2010). It is important to note that the 
theoretical emphasis on political instability is linked to the definition of terrorism used in this 
study: the threatened use of force by sub-national actors with the aim of employing 
intimidation to secure political goals (see Enders & Sandler, 2006; Czinkota et al., 2010). The 
relationship between investments and terrorism is further apparent in the perspective that 
terrorism is distinct from other forms of violence because it targets for the most part, non-
combatant individuals (see Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014), in order to increase pressure on 
targeted governments. The theoretical construct is also consistent with the definition of 
capital flight in this study: the outflow of economic resources from countries in order to 
maintain the economic value of such resources (see Asongu, 2014; Ndikumana et al., 2015).  
The empirical literature on the determinants of capital flight has documented the 
following features as likely causes of the outward flow of capital from a country: risks and 
returns on investment (e.g. domestic tax rate, financial instability and currency depreciation); 
economic structural features (e.g. dependence on natural resources); governance and political 
characteristics. The political environment has been identified as an important factor in capital 
flight because it is connected with the damage or loss of assets as well as increase in 
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investment-related insurance premiums (Collier et al., 2004; Davies, 2008; Ndikumana et al., 
2015). Such factors when combined with terrorism are very likely to prompt investors to 
transfer their capital to countries with lower investment risks.  
 
2.2 Linkage between military expenditure and terrorism  
Two principal theoretical views have been documented on the links between military 
expenditure and terrorism (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010). On the one hand, terrorism increases 
military expenditure because more funds are likely to be allocated for defense purposes in 
view of curbing present and potential terrorists’ threats. Therefore, when military expenditure 
is the outcome indicator, a positive nexus is expected. On the other hand, a boost in military 
spending is expected to decrease terrorism. Hence, from a theoretical perspective, when 
terrorism is the dependent variable, its relationship with military spending is anticipated to be 
negative.  This theoretical view fits the context of the present inquiry because we are using 
military expenditure as a policy variable in the fight against terrorism.  
In essence, we are investigating the role of military spending in dampening the effects 
of capital flight for terrorism purposes. Nevertheless, the nexus between terrorism and 
military spending remains an open debate partly because some studies have established that 
military spending does not necessarily reduce terrorism (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010, p.195). 
Accordingly, counterterrorism efforts may be counterproductive because instead of 
preventing terrorism, they could increase it (see Sandler, 2005). Furthermore, lack of 
common and comprehensive long-run policies on counterterrorism at the international level 
has increased the ineffectiveness of country-specific counterterrorism policies (Omand, 
2005). This narrative is broadly consistent with the evidence that anti-terror policies by the 
United States have further fuelled terrorism (see Lum et al., 2006).   
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
We examine a panel data of 37 African countries for the period 1996-2010 from four sources: 
(i) African Development Indicators of the World Bank, (ii) the Global Terrorism Database; 
(iii) terrorism incidents from Enders et al. (2011) and Gailbulloev et al. (2012) and (iv) 
capital flight from Boyce and Ndikumana (2012a). The choice of this period is motivated 
partly by data availability constraints. For instance, it ends in 2010 because data on capital 
flight is only available up to this year. Both annual data and non-overlapping intervals are 
used to ensure that the behaviour of data is consistent with adopted empirical strategies. 
While annual data is used in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects and Quantile 
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Regressions, three year non-overlapping intervals are used in the Generalised Methods of 
Moment (GMM). In the GMM, data averages are needed to limit over-identification or 
instrument proliferation. Hence, given the sample period, we have five three-year non-
overlapping intervals: 1996-1998; 1999-2001; 2002-2004; 2005-2007 and 2008-2010. 
The capital flight dependent variable from Boyce and Ndikumana (2012a) represents 
unrecorded capital flows between one country and the rest of the world, whose measurement 
starts from inflows of foreign exchanges that are accounted for in a country’s Balance of 
Payments, in which missing money (the difference between recorded inflows and recorded 
outflows) is presented as ‘net errors and omissions’. This conception and definition is 
increasingly being employed in the capital flight literature (Weeks, 2015; Efobi & Asongu, 
2016). The main drawback in the capital flight measurement is that it is not comparable with 
other variables since it is given in constant 2010 US Dollar terms. Consistent with Asongu 
(2014), we address the problem by first converting current GDP to constant 2010 terms; then 
dividing the corresponding value by 1 000 000 to obtain a ‘GDP constant of 2010 USD (in 
millions) and finally dividing the capital flight data by the ‘GDP constant of 2010 USD (in 
millions). Ultimately we have a transformed capital measurement that is comparable with 
other variables (see Appendix 1). 
Four main indicators of terrorism are used, namely: domestic, transnational, unclear 
and total terrorism. Terrorism-specific definitions are from Efobi et al. (2015). Domestic 
terrorism “includes all incidences of terrorist activities that involves the nationals of the 
venue country: implying that the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and supporters are all 
from the venue country” (Efobi et al., 2015, p.6; see also Sönmez, 1998; Czinkota et al., 
2010). Transnational terrorism is “terrorism including those acts of terrorism that concerns at 
least two countries. This implies that the perpetrator, supporters and incidence may be 
from/in one country, but the victim and target is from another” (Efobi et al., 2015, p.6). 
Unclear terrorism is that, “which constitutes incidences of terrorism that can neither be 
defined as domestic nor transnational terrorism” (Efobi et al., 2015,p.6). Total terrorism is 
the sum of domestic, transnational and unclear terrorisms.  
The terrorism variables represent the registered number of yearly terrorism incidents 
in a country. In order to limit mathematical concerns asociated with log-transforming zeros 
on the one hand and correct for the positive skew in the data on the other hand, the study 
takes natural logarithms of terrorism incidents by adding one to the base. This transformation 
approach has been recently used by Choi and Salehyan (2013) and Bandyopadhyay et al. 
(2014).  
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The military expenditure policy variable is consistent with Feridun and Shahbaz 
(2010) while the control variables include five non-dummy (lagged dependent variable, trade 
openness, GDP growth, inflation and foreign direct investment) and two-dummy variables 
(non-oil exporting and politically-stable countries).  These control variables have been 
substantially documented in the literature on capital flight (Boyce & Ndikumana, 1998, 2001, 
2003, 2008, 2011, 2012ab; Weeks, 2012; Asongu, 2013, 2015). First, because of the capital 
flight trap, lagged values of capital flight are expected to increase future capital flight. 
Second, economic growth could either decrease or increase capital flight contingent on 
whether the underlying growth is broad-based or concentrated in selected sectors of the 
economy (e.g. heavy resource industries). On the one hand, when a few extractive industries 
drive growth, such growth is very likely to be linked with capital flight. On the other hand, 
broad-based economic growth could reduce capital flight because it translates into a positive 
outlook for investment.  
Third, chaotic inflation induces capital flight for the most part because it is connected 
with uncertainty in the return to investment and a negative economic outlook. This intuition 
is consistent with documented evidence that investors are more comfortable with strategies of 
investment that are less ambiguous (Le Roux & Kelsey, 2016; Kelsey & Le Roux, 2016). 
Fourth, the expected signs from trade and foreign direct investment cannot be established a 
priori because they depend on whether they are broad-based or limited to a few sectors of the 
economy. This narrative underlying this perspective is consistent the discourse on economic 
growth. Accordingly, trade and financial globalisation may be associated with capital flight 
because they provide opportunities of accounting practices like transfer mispricing 
(Ndikumana & Boyce 2011ab; Asongu, 2015).   
Politically unstable countries should naturally be associated with more capital flight 
whereas non-oil exporting countries should be associated with less capital flight. The 
intuition for this narrative that builds on Ndikumana and Boyce (2012a) and Weeks (2012) is 
consistent with the narratives on non-dummy variables above. Detailed criteria for oil-
exporting and politically-stable countries are found in Asongu (2014). Oil-exporting 
countries are those for which exports are oil-dominated for at least half of the sampled 
periodicity, whereas political instability is based on civil wars, conflicts and substantial 
political strife during a considerable portion of the periodicity. The definitions and sources of 
the variables and corresponding summary statistics are provided in Appendix 1 whereas the 
correlation matrix is disclosed in Appendix 2.  
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3.2 Methodology  
 
Four main estimation approaches are adopted in order to control for various factors. We 
begin with baseline contemporary and non-contemporary OLS, contemporary and non-
contemporary Fixed effects (FE) regressions to account for the unobserved heterogeneity, the 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) to account for the capital flight trap and Quantile 
Regressions (QR) to account for initial levels of capital flight. The OLS specifications are 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) in terms of standard errors, a 
Hausman test is employed to justify the FE regressions whereas the GMM approach is 
justified by persistence in capital flight as well as the need to also control for time-invariant 
omitted variables. The use of non-contemporary regressions in order to have some bite on 
endogeneity is consistent with Mlachila et al. (2014, p.21).  
 
3.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares and Fixed Effects regressions 
 The panel FE model is presented as follows: 
 
tiitih
h
htitititi WMTMTCap ,,,
4
1
,3,2,10,   

                                                   (1) 
Where: tiCap ,  
is the capital flight indicator of country i
 
at  period t ;  is a constant;
 
T , 
terrorism (domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism); M , military expenditure; 
MT , interaction between military expenditure  (M) and terrorism  (T);
 
W  is the vector of 
control variables  (Trade, GDP growth, Inflation  and Foreign Investment,);
 i

 
is the country-
specific effects (which include politically-stable and Non-Oil  exporting countries)  and ti ,  
the error term. The corresponding OLS specification is without country-specific effects.   
Given that the objective of the study is to assess military expenditure thresholds at which the 
negative effect of capital flight for terrorism can be mitigated, it is important to briefly 
engage some pitfalls that are linked with interactive regressions. As documented by Brambor 
et al. (2006), all constitutive terms should enter into the regressions and the estimates 
corresponding to the interactive terms are considered as conditional or marginal effects. In 
addition, for the computed thresholds to make economic sense, they should be with the range 
(from minimum to maximum) provided by summary statistics. Batuo (2015) has recently 
employed interactive regressions within the framework of the critical mass or threshold 
theory.  
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3.2.2 Generalised Method of Moments: specification, identification and exclusion restriction 
At least five reasons motivate the choice this estimation technique, the first-two are 
requirements for the technique whereas the last-three are associated advantages. First, the 
technique enables control for the capital flight trap since the criterion for the persistence of 
capital flight met. Accordingly, the correlation between capital flight and its first lag is 0.867 
which is above the 0.800 criterion used to ascertain persistence in dependent variables. 
Second, the N (or 37)>T(or 5) criterion for the employment of the GMM technique is also 
met because the number of cross sections is higher than the number of time series in each 
cross section. Third, the technique accounts for endogeneity in all regressors by using 
instrumental values of regressors and controlling for time invariant omitted variables. Fourth, 
the system GMM estimator controls for small biases in the difference GMM estimator. Fifth, 
cross-country variations are considered in the specifications.  
While the system GMM estimator by Blundell and Bond (1998) and Arellano and 
Bond (1995) has been documented (see Bond et al., 2001, pp. 3-4) to have better properties 
than the difference estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991), this study adopts an approach that 
uses forward orthogonal deviations. This is a Roodman (2009ab) extension of Arellano and 
Bover (1995) that employs forward orthogonal deviations instead of differences that has been 
documented to restrict over-identification and limit instrument proliferation (see Baltagi, 
2008; Love & Zicchino, 2006).  A two-step specification is adopted instead of a one-step 
approach because it control for heteroscedasticity.  
The following equations in levels (2) and first difference (3) summarize the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
 tititih
h
htititititi WMTMTCapCap ,,,
4
1
,4,3,2,10,    

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

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


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
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h
h
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MTMTMMTTCapCapCapCap
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4
1
,,3,,3,,22,,10,,
)()(
)()()()(
                                                                                                                                            (3) 
Where:  represents the coefficient of autoregression and t  
is the time-specific constant.   
 We devote space to discussing identification and exclusion restrictions. In accordance 
with recent literature, all independent variables are considered as predetermined or suspected 
endogenous whereas only years are considered as strictly exogenous (Dewan & Ramaprasad, 
2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a), essentially because it is not apparent for years to 
become endogenous in first-difference (see Roodman, 2009b). Therefore the technique for 
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treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv(years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is adopted for 
predetermined variables.  
 In the light of the above, strictly exogenous instruments or years affect capital flight 
exclusively through the predetermined or endogenous explaining variables. Furthermore, the 
statistical relevance of the exclusion restriction is examined with the Difference in Hansen 
Test (DHT) for instrument exogeneity. Accordingly, the null hypothesis of this test should 
not be rejected in order for the instruments to elucidate capital flight exclusively via the 
endogenous indicators. In essence, whereas in the standard instrumental variable (IV) 
approach, a rejection of the null hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) 
test is an indication that the instruments explain the dependent variable beyond the 
predetermined variables (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b), in the GMM 
approach that employs forward orthogonal deviations, the information criterion used to 
examine whether years exhibit strict exogeneity is the DHT.  Hence, in the results that would 
be reported, the exclusion restriction is confirmed if the alternative hypothesis of the DHT 
corresponding to IV (year, eq(diff)) is rejected. 
 
3.2.3 Quantile Regressions (QR) 
In order to control for the initial levels of capital flight, the study employs QR which has been 
documented in the literature on conditional determinants to assess effects on the outcome 
variable throughout the conditional distributions of the dependent variable (Koenker & 
Bassett, 1978; Keonker & Hallock, 2001; Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012). 
Accordingly, the QR approach consists of assessing the investigated relationships with 
particular emphasis on countries with low, intermediate and high levels of capital flight.  
 Whereas mean effects provided by OLS, FE and GMM regressions are relevant, this 
approach complements the first-three approaches by emphasising existing levels of capital 
flight. Furthermore, whereas OLS is based on the hypothesis of normally distributed errors 
terms, QR is not based on such an assumption of error terms that are normally distributed.  
The  th quintile estimator of capital flight is obtained by solving for the following 
optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts for simplicity in Eq. (4) 
   






 
 







ii
i
ii
i
k
xyii
i
xyii
i
R
xyxy
::
)1(min
                                                    (4) 
Where  1,0 . As opposed to OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised. For 
example, the 25
th
 or 75
th
 quintiles (with  =0.25 or 0.75 respectively) are assessed by 
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approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quintile of capital flight or iy given 
ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                                           (5) 
Where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quintile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are investigated only at 
the mean of the conditional distribution of capital flight. For the model in Eq. (4), the 
dependent variable iy  is a capital flight indicator whereas ix  contains a constant term, Trade, 
GDP growth, Inflation, Foreign Investment, Politically-stable and Non-Oil exporting 
countries.  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Baseline regressions and accounting for the unobserved heterogeneity  
 Table 1 presents OLS and FE results. Whereas Panel A discloses OLS findings, Panel 
B reveals findings on FE. For either panel, the left-hand-side (right-hand-side) provides 
contemporary (non-contemporary) regressions. The FE specifications are justified by the 
overwhelming rejection of the null hypotheses of the Hausman test.  First, the following 
findings can be established from Panel A. All terrorism variables unconditionally and 
consistently increase capital flight while the corresponding conditional or marginal effects 
from interactive coefficients are not consistently significant. Second, in Panel B, the 
unconditional effects of terrorism are not consistently significant whereas the conditional 
impacts are consistently positive for the interactions of military expenditure with 
transnational and total terrorism. Third, for either panel, thresholds cannot be computed 
because either unconditional effects, conditional impacts or both are not significant in every 
specification. Fourth, most of the control variables are significant with expected signs.  
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Table 1: Contemporary and Non-contemporary OLS and Fixed-effects 
          
Dependent variable: Capital Flight 
 
Panel A: Baseline Contemporary and Non-contemporary effects (HAC SE OLS) 
 
 Contemporary  effects  Non-Contemporary effects 
          
          
Constant  10.235*** 10.366*** 10.386*** 10.187*** Constant  10.215*** 10.347*** 10.341*** 10.164*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic Terrorism (D.T) 0.288*** --- --- --- Domestic Terrorism (D.T)(-1) 0.284** --- --- --- 
 (0.007)   ---  (0.012)    
Transnational Terrorism (Tr.T) --- 0.176** ---  Transnational Terrorism (Tr.T)(-1) --- 0.169** --- --- 
  (0.037)     (0.048)   
Unclear Terrorism (U.T) --- --- 0.261* --- Unclear Terrorism (U.T)(-1) --- --- 0.286* --- 
   (0.077)     (0.051)  
Total Terrorism (T. T) --- --- --- 0.212** Total Terrorism (T. T)(-1) --- --- --- 0.210** 
    (0.012)     (0.015) 
Military Expenditure(M.E) 0.030 -0.026 -0.008 0.007 Military Expenditure (M.E)(-1) 0.026 -0.025 -0.006 0.005 
 (0.343) (0.416) (0.758) (0.833)  (0.403) (0.429) (0.806)) (0.883) 
D.T*ME -0.056 --- --- --- D.T*ME(-1) -0.053 --- --- --- 
 (0.117)     (0.150)    
Tr.T*ME --- 0.017 --- --- Tr.T*ME(-1) --- 0.018 --- --- 
  (0.517)     (0.499)   
U.T*ME --- --- -0.009 --- U.T*ME(-1) --- --- -0.012 --- 
   (0.845)     (0.777)  
T.T*ME --- --- --- -0.024 T.T*ME(-1) --- --- --- -0.023 
    (0.414)     (0.443) 
Trade -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002** Trade(-1) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.011)  (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.019) 
GDP growth   0.006 0.008 0.009 0.008 GDP growth(-1) 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.008 
 (0.359) (0.273) (0.199) (0.260)  (0.376) (0.305) (0.232) (0.280) 
Inflation  0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** Inflation(-1) 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Investment  -0.006 -0.009* -0.008 -0.006 Foreign Investment(-1) -0.005 -0.008 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.349) (0.082) (0.156) (0.296)  (0.419) (0.131) (0.266) (0.376) 
Nonconflicts  0.162* 0.178* 0.128 0.182** Nonconflicts  0.156* 0.177* 0.132 0.179* 
 (0.073) (0.055) (0.152) (0.046)  (0.094) (0.063) (0.150) (0.156) 
NonOil  -0.316*** -0.325*** -0.331*** -0.292*** NonOil  -0.316*** -0.330*** -0.324*** -0.292*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
          
Net Effect  of M.E n.a n.a n.a n.a Net Effect  of M.E n.a n.a n.a n.a 
          
Adjusted R² 0.156 0.144 0.140 0.160 Adjusted R² 0.153 0.142 0.142 0.158 
Fisher  9.27*** 10.04*** 10.09*** 10.19*** Fisher  8.48*** 9.17*** 9.64*** 9.45*** 
Observations  405 405 405 405 Observations  385 385 385 385 
          
          
Panel B: Contemporary and Non-contemporary effects (HAC SE Panel Fixed-Effects) 
 
 Contemporary  effects  Non-Contemporary effects 
    
Constant  9.800*** 9.962*** 9.827*** 9.903*** Constant  9.738*** 9.897*** 9.749*** 9.833*** 
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 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic Terrorism (D.T) 0.014 --- --- --- Domestic Terrorism (D.T)(-1) 0.014 --- --- --- 
 (0.777)     (0.788)    
Transnational Terrorism (Tr.T) --- -0.022 --- --- Transnational Terrorism (Tr.T)(-1) --- -0.019 --- --- 
  (0.702)     (0.753)   
Unclear Terrorism (U.T) --- --- 0.014 --- Unclear Terrorism (U.T)  (-1) --- --- 0.043 --- 
   (0.853)     (0.583)  
Total Terrorism (T. T) --- --- --- -0.028 Total Terrorism (T. T)(-1) --- --- --- -0.022 
    (0.518)     (0.628) 
Military Expenditure (M.E) -0.056** -0.119*** -0.081*** -0.106*** Military Expenditure (M.E)(-1) -0.053** -0.112*** -0.074*** -0.100*** 
 (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.042) (0.000) (0.002) (0.00) 
D.T*ME -0.0001 --- --- --- D.T*ME(-1) 0.0006 --- --- --- 
 (0.994)     (0.968)    
Tr.T*ME --- 0.045*** --- --- Tr.T*ME(-1) --- 0.042** --- --- 
  (0.008)     (0.016)   
U.T*ME --- --- 0.030 --- U.T*ME(-1) --- --- 0.024 --- 
   (0.130)     (0.231)  
T.T*ME --- --- --- 0.026** T.T*ME(-1) --- --- --- 0.025* 
    (0.043)     (0.066) 
Trade 0.004*** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.004*** Trade(-1) 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.002) (0.005)  (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) 
GDP growth   0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 GDP growth(-1) 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.707) (0.641) (0.595) (0.610)  (0.782) (0.722) (0.650) (0.673) 
Inflation  0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** Inflation (-1) 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Investment  0.007* 0.006 0.006 0.006 Foreign Investment(-1)  0.007* 0.006 0.006 0.005 
 (0.059) (0.109) (0.110) (0.138)  (0.083) (0.146) (0.127) (0.171) 
          
Net Effect of M.E n.a n.a n.a n.a Net Effect  of M.E n.a n.a n.a n.a 
          
Hausman  34.24*** 24.83*** 34.85*** 31.79*** Hausman  33.78*** 24.42*** 34.10*** 31.52*** 
Within  R² 0.117 0.146 0.138 0.132 Within  R² 0.120 0.146 0.142 0.135 
Fisher  6.93*** 8.95*** 8.32*** 7.95*** Fisher  6.75*** 8.45*** 8.17*** 7.69*** 
Countries  34 34 34 34 Countries  34 34 34 34 
Observations  405 405 405 405 Observations  385 385 385 385 
          
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. HAC SE: Heteroscedasticity & Autocorrelation Consistent Standard Errors. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. n.a: not applicable because at least one estimated 
coefficient required for the computation of the military expenditure threshold is not significant. Nonconflicts: Politically stable countries. Nonoil: Non-oil exporting countries.  
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4.2 Generalised Method of Moments and accounting for the capital flight trap 
Table 2 provides GMM findings in order to control for the capital flight trap. Four principal 
information criteria are employed to assess the validity of the GMM model with forward 
orthogonal deviations
1
. The following findings can be established. First, with the exception of 
unclear terrorism related regressions that respectively display negative and positive 
unconditional and conditional effects, and some scanty evidence of positive conditional 
impacts associated with transnational terrorism and total terrorism, military expenditure 
thresholds cannot be established for the most part. Second, evidence of a capital flight trap is 
confirmed because the estimated value of the lagged capital flight is between zero and one. 
This is implies that:   (i) past values of capital flight increase present capital flights and (ii) 
countries with lower levels of capital flight are catching-up their counterparts with higher 
levels of capital flight.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen 
overidentification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not 
robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the 
number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for the 
joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2016, p.9) 
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Table 2: Dynamic GMM specifications (Based on 3 Year Non-Overlapping Intervals) 
          
Dependent Variable : Capital Flight  
      
 Domestic Terrorism  Transnational Terrorism  Unclear Terrorism  Total Terrorism  
         
Capital Flight (-1) 0.739*** 0.774*** 0.596*** 0.607*** 0.777*** 0.851*** 0.719*** 0.690*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  2.691*** 2.300*** 4.228*** 4.017*** 2.724*** 1.792*** 3.154*** 3.233*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic Terrorism (D.T) -0.042 -0.005 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.613) (0.930)       
Transnational Terrorism (Tr.T) --- --- -0.056 -0.037 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.207) (0.780)     
Unclear Terrorism (U.T) --- --- --- --- -0.384*** -0.441* --- --- 
     (0.000) (0.062)   
Total Terrorism (T. T) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.038 -0.104 
       (0.447) (0.113) 
Military Expenditure (M.E) -0.098*** -0.001 -0.093*** -0.045 -0.176*** -0.106*** -0.069* 0.036 
 (0.009) (0.977) (0.000) (0.260) (0.000) (0.004) (0.053) (0.341) 
D.T*ME 0.017 -0.021 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.346) (0.175)       
Tr.T*ME --- --- 0.082*** --- --- --- --- --- 
   (0.000)      
U.T*ME --- --- --- 0.027 0.301*** 0.191*** --- --- 
    (0.532) (0.000) (0.004)   
T.T*ME --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.021** 0.013 
       (0.024) (0.404) 
Trade 0.0004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.0003 -0.004*** 
 (0.689) (0.133) (0.443) (0.100) (0.006) (0.005) (0.754) (0.003) 
GDP growth   -0.007 -0.008 -0.001 -0.0001 -0.013*** 0.0007 -0.004 -0.007 
 (0.126) (0.361) (0.655) (0.987) (0.004) (0.912) (0.210) (0.230) 
Inflation  --- 0.003*** --- 0.003*** --- 0.003*** --- 0.003*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Foreign Investment  --- -0.008* --- -0.011*** --- -0.013*** --- -0.019*** 
  (0.071)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
         
M.E Thresholds n.a n.a n.a n.a n.s.a n.s.a n.a n.a 
         
AR(1) (0.098) (0.024) (0.118) (0.027) (0.130) (0.043) (0.118) (0.035) 
AR(2) (0.507) (0.717) (0.456) (0.582) (0.878) (0.756) (0.371) (0.843) 
Sargan OIR (0.355) (0.001) (0.087) (0.001) (0.127) (0.000) (0.381) (0.003) 
Hansen OIR (0.256) (0.625) (0.838) (0.719) (0.266) (0.783) (0.453) (0.890) 
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DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.510) (0.118) (0.306) (0.093) (0.901) (0.260) (0.414) (0.383) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.184) (0.930) (0.952) (0.986) (0.095) (0.934) (0.445) (0.962) 
(b) IV (years, eq (diff))         
H excluding group (0.393) (0.379) (0.736) (0.886) (0.222) (0.702) (.0.562) (0.684) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.137) (1.000) (0.789) (0.122) (0.471) (0.725) (0.220) (1.000) 
         
Fisher  736.55*** 643.53*** 279.75*** 16179*** 648.03*** 5200.47*** 969.42*** 379.00*** 
Instruments  26 34 26 34 26 34 26 34 
Countries  29 28 29 28 29 28 29 28 
Observations  93 90 93 90 93 90 93 90 
£          
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold 
values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the 
instruments in the Sargan OIR test. n.a: not applicable because at least one estimated coefficient required for the computation of the military expenditure threshold is not significant. n.s.a: not specifically applicable because 
the military expenditure threshold is contrary to the intuition of the study.   
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4.3 Quantile Regressions and accounting for initial levels of capital flight  
 
Table 3 and Table 4 respectively show findings corresponding to ‘domestic and transnational 
terrorism’ and ‘unclear and total terrorism’. Panel A(B) of Table 3 reveals findings on 
domestic (transnational) terrorism while Panel A(B) of Table 4 shows findings on unclear 
(total) terrorism. In Table 3, the following findings are apparent. First, while for the most part, 
conditional and unconditional impacts are consistently significant in regressions pertaining to 
domestic regressions, this is not the case of regressions related to transnational terrorism for 
which the conditional and unconditional effects are not significant. Second, military 
expenditure thresholds for fighting the effect of capital flight for domestic terrorism ranges 
between 4.224 and 5.612 in contemporary regressions and between 4.308 and 5.600 in non-
contemporary regressions. For instance, the threshold in the 0.10
th
 quintile of contemporary 
regressions in Panel A of Table 3 is 5.612 (0.550/0.098). Hence, a critical mass of 5.612 of 
military expenditure as a percentage of GDP is needed to reverse the effects of domestic 
terrorism stemming from capital flight.  The threshold makes economic sense because it is 
within the range of military expenditure (0.220 to 17.334) provided in the summary statistics. 
Third, most of the control variables have expected signs.  
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Table  3: QR   for Domestic and Transnational terrorism  
             
 Dependent variable: Capital Flight  
  
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism (Domestic T) 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  10.235*** 9.293*** 9.979*** 10.375*** 10.592*** 10.961*** 10.215*** 9.267*** 9.947*** 10.393*** 10.536*** 10.735*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic T. (D.T) 0.288*** 0.550*** 0.425*** 0.365*** 0.294*** 0.286*** 0.284** 0.560*** 0.413*** 0.349*** 0.325*** 0.325*** 
 (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.006) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
MiliaryExp.(M.E) 0.030 -0.042 0.009 0.002 0.075** 0.111*** 0.026 -0.041 -0.022 -0.009 0.078*** 0.132*** 
 (0.343) (0.475) (0.830) (0.951) (0.020) (0.003) (0.403) (0.527) (0.645) (0.792) (0.008) (0.001) 
D.T*ME -0.056 -0.098*** -0.096*** -0.086*** -0.058** -0.058* -0.053 -0.100*** -0.084*** -0.081*** -0.067** -0.069** 
 (0.117) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.055) (0.065) (0.150) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.017) (0.039) 
Trade -0.002*** -0.0008 -0.002* -0.003** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.0005 -0.002 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
 (0.004) (0.615) (0.076) (0.022) (0.005) (0.000) (0.008) (0.742) (0.148) (0.027) (0.011) (0.011) 
GDP growth   0.006 0.016 0.002 0.012 0.005 -0.001 0.006 0.013 0.003 0.012 0.005 -0.0005 
 (0.359) (0.204) (0.845) (0.196) (0.467) (0.892) (0.376) (0.365) (0.766) (0.185) (0.473) (0.951) 
Inflation  0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.001*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Invt. -0.006 -0.010 -0.008 -0.012 -0.015** 0.002 -0.005 -0.010 -0.008 -0.011 -0.015*** -0.004 
 (0.349) (0.147) (0.378) (0.140) (0.024) (0.661) (0.419) (0.204) (0.448) (0.150) (0.008) (0.551) 
Nonconflicts  0.162* 0.187 0.283** 0.173 0.111 0.035 0.156* 0.154 0.267* 0.169 0.122 0.057 
 (0.073) (0.207) (0.032) (0.135) (0.271) (0.774) (0.094) (0.305) (0.061) (0.121) (0.197) (0.644) 
NonOil  -0.316*** -0.222 -0.521*** -0.375*** -0.331*** -0.084 -0.316*** -0.198 -0.498*** -0.438*** -0.318*** -0.069 
 (0.001) (0.178) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.463) (0.001) (0.266) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.558) 
             
M.E Thresholds n.a 5.612 4.427 4.244 5.068 4.931 n.a 5.600 4.916 4.308 4.850 4.710 
             
R²/Pseudo R² 0.156 0.095 0.115 0.122 0.133 0.116 0.153 0.092 0.107 0.117 0.134 0.118 
Fisher  9.27***      8.48***      
Observations  405 405 405 405 405 405 385 385 385 385 385 385 
             
             
 Panel B:  Transnational  Terrorism (Transactional  Tr) 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  10.366*** 9.384*** 10.013*** 10.275*** 11.022*** 11.197*** 10.347*** 9.389*** 10.058*** 10.242*** 11.020*** 10.979*** 
20 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Transnational T. (T.Tr) 0.176** -0.016 0.311*** 0.298*** 0.170** 0.222 0.169** -0.029 0.305*** 0.330*** 0.096 0.242* 
 (0.037) (0.923) (0.001) (0.000) (0.027) (0.121) (0.048) (0.847) (0.001) (0.003) (0.311) (0.066) 
MiliaryExp.(M.E) -0.026 -0.063 -0.066* -0.033 0.011 0.095* -0.025 -0.068 -0.067* -0.021 0.004 0.097* 
 (0.416) (0.451) (0.079) (0.214) (0.648) (0.091) (0.429) (0.367) (0.087) (0.552) (0.896) (0.056) 
T.Tr*ME 0.017 0.081* 0.012 -0.013 0.013 -0.040 0.018 0.085** 0.014 -0.029 0.019 -0.045 
 (0.517) (0.072) (0.620) (0.572) (0.444) (0.264) (0.499) (0.035) (0.591) (0.352) (0.352) (0.170) 
Trade -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002* -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002* -0.003** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.652) (0.071) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.614) (0.052) (0.014) (0.000) (0.001) 
GDP growth   0.008 0.012 -0.005 0.021*** 0.006 0.002 0.008 0.016 -0.006 0.021** 0.006 0.003 
 (0.273) (0.480) (0.522) (0.004) (0.418) (0.923) (0.305) (0.361) (0.492) (0.032) (0.500) (0.860) 
Inflation  0.0006*** 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** -0.015*** 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Invt. -0.009* -0.005 -0.008 -0.010* -0.006 0.0003 -0.008 -0.005 -0.008 -0.010 -0.014** -0.001 
 (0.082) (0.607) (0.364) (0.083) (0.941) (0.972) (0.131) (0.589) (0.365) (0.210) (0.018) (0.881) 
Nonconflicts  0.178* 0.195 0.313*** 0.284*** -0.006 0.040 0.177* 0.195 0.321*** 0.328*** -0.002 0.142 
 (0.055) (0.358) (0.006) (0.001) (0.941) (0.808) (0.063) (0.303) (0.007) (0.004) (0.985) (0.396) 
NonOil  -0.325*** -0.261 -0.432*** -0.371*** -0.412*** -0.220 -0.330*** -0.290 -0.466*** -0.409*** -0.427*** -0.214 
 (0.000) (0.256) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.112) (0.001) (0.198) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.103) 
             
M.E Thresholds n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
             
R²/Pseudo R² 0.144 0.066 0.115 0.112 0.122 0.090 0.142 0.066 0.097 0.109 0.122 0.089 
Fisher  10.04***      9.17***      
Observations  405 405 405 405 405 405 385 385 385 385 385 385 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Capital Least is least.. n.a: not 
applicable because at least one estimated coefficient required for the computation of the military expenditure threshold is not significant. Nonconflicts: Politically stable countries. Nonoil: Non-oil exporting countries.  
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Table  4: QR   for Unclear and Total terrorism  
             
 Dependent variable: Capital Flight  
  
 Panel A:  Unclear Terrorism (Unclear T) 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  10.386*** 9.331*** 10.067*** 10.433*** 11.141*** 11.247*** 10.341*** 9.335*** 10.056*** 10.416*** 11.093*** 11.141*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unclear T. (U.T) 0.261* 0.406** 0.414** 0.453*** 0.110 0.235 0.286* 0.403* 0.486*** 0.482*** 0.151 0.290 
 (0.077) (0.068) (0.012) (0.000) (0.415) (0.409) (0.051) (0.078) (0.003) (0.002) (0.310) (0.250) 
Military Exp.(M.E) -0.008 -0.045 -0.041 -0.032 0.036 0.094 -0.006 -0.046 -0.043 -0.030 0.035 0.100** 
 (0.753) (0.448) (0.310) (0.141) (0.144) (0.110) (0.806)) (0.464) (0.296) (0.328) (0.188) (0.048) 
U.T*ME -0.009 -0.017 -0.054 -0.079*** 0.008 -0.056 -0.012 -0.016 -0.066* -0.081** 0.005 -0.064 
 (0.845) (0.707) (0.153) (0.005) (0.770) (0.369) (0.777) (0.731) (0.081) (0.035) (0.862) (0.245) 
Trade -0.002*** -0.0005 -0.002* -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.0005 -0.002* -0.002** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 (0.003) (0.751) (0.090) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.762) (0.089) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP growth   0.009 0.015 0.001 0.024*** 0.005 0.002 0.009 0.015 0.002 0.024** 0.001 0.003 
 (0.199) (0.341) (0.888) (0.000) (0.407) (0.933) (0.232) (0.342) (0.857) (0.017) (0.835) (0.881) 
Inflation  0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.001*** 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.001*** 0.0008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Invt. -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 -0.011** -0.013** 0.0002 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.011 -0.012** 0.001 
 (0.156) (0.462) (0.435) (0.047) (0.023) (0.984) (0.266) (0.473) (0.509) (0.152) (0.047) (0.887) 
Nonconflicts  0.128 0.163 0.277** 0.111 -0.140* 0.040 0.132 0.158 0.257* 0.125 -0.128 0.075 
 (0.152) (0.323) (0.040) (0.152) (0.098) (0.828) (0.150) (0.362) (0.058) (0.256) (0.173) (0.673) 
NonOil  -0.331*** -0.248 -0.488*** -0.361*** -0.394*** -0.267 -0.324*** -0.252*** -0.462*** -0.384*** -0.373*** -0.226 
 (0.001) (0.184) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.124) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.150) 
             
M.E Thresholds n.a n.a n.a 5.734 n.a n.a n.a n.a 7.363 5.950 n.a n.a 
             
R²/Pseudo R² 0.140 0.079 0.096 0.102 0.117 0.091 0.142 0.081 0.093 0.102 0.117 0.096 
Fisher  10.09***      9.64***      
Observations  405 405 405 405 405 405 385 385 385 385 385 385 
             
             
 Panel B: Total Terrorism (Total  T) 
 Contemporary  Non-Contemporary  
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  10.187*** 9.205*** 9.918*** 10.220*** 10.485*** 10.739*** 10.164*** 9.260*** 9.785*** 10.186*** 10.478*** 10.658*** 
 (0.000° (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total T. (T.T) 0.212** 0.385*** 0.311*** 0.391*** 0.248*** 0.225*** 0.210** 0.362*** 0.349*** 0.351*** 0.202** 0.246*** 
 (0.012) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.004) (0.015) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.002) 
Military Exp.(M.E) 0.007 -0.035 -0.038 0.026 0.059 0.113*** 0.005 -0.007 -0.030 0.020 0.33 0.115*** 
 (0.833) (0.703) (0.441) (0.506) (0.175) (0.004) (0.883) (0.928) (0.585) (0.646) (0.390) (0.006) 
T.T*ME -0.024 -0.053 -0.047* -0.083*** -0.033 -0.042** -0.023 -0.053 -0.059** -0.072*** -0.009 -0.044** 
 (0.414) (0.184) (0.050) (0.000) (0.272) (0.039) (0.443) (0.130) (0.029) (0.004) (0.733) (0.026) 
Trade -0.002** 0.0001 -0.002 -0.003*** -0.001* -0.002*** -0.002** -0.001 -0.002 -0.002** -0.001* -0.002** 
 (0.011) (0.961) (0.118) (0.008) (0.095) (0.008) (0.019) (0.472) (0.210) (0.047) (0.068) (0.010) 
GDP growth   0.008 0.023 0.003 0.008 0.008 0.002*** 0.008 0.020 0.004 0.008 0.009 0.003 
 (0.260) (0.174) (0.746) (0.409) (0.363) (0.008) (0.280) (0.176) (0.726) (0.425) (0.253) (0.691) 
Inflation  0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Invt. -0.006 -0.011 -0.005 -0.012 -0.013* -0.001 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008 -0.013 -0.010 -0.0008 
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 (0.296) (0.241) (0.583) (0.109) (0.071) (0.855) (0.376) (0.346) (0.460) (0.146) (0.120) (0.900) 
Nonconflicts  0.182** 0.125 0.304** 0.299*** 0.096 0.122 0.179* 0.184 0.331** 0.320** 0.061 0.130 
 (0.046) (0.542) (0.025) (0.006) (0.405) (0.342) (0.156) (0.336) (0.026) (0.010) (0.555) (0.313) 
NonOil  -0.292*** -0.243 -0.465*** -0.350*** -0.282** -0.088 -0.292*** -0.349* -0.404** -0.382*** -0.247** -0.053 
 (0.002) (0.255) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.437) (0.003) (0.082) (0.010) (0.002) (0.014) (0.641) 
             
M.E Thresholds n.a n.a 6.617 4.710 n.a 5.357 n.a n.a 5.915 4.875 n.a 5.590 
             
R²/Pseudo R² 0.160 0.084 0.119 0.131 0.131 0.115 0.158 0.082 0.113 0.126 0.133 0.117 
Fisher  10.19***      9.45***      
Observations  405 405 405 405 405 405 385 385 385 385 385 385 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Capital Least is least.. n.a: not 
applicable because at least one estimated coefficient required for the computation of the military expenditure threshold is not significant. Nonconflicts: Politically stable countries. Nonoil: Non-oil exporting countries.  
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The following findings are apparent in Table 4. First, in Panel A, the unconditional and 
conditional effects are significant in the 0.50
th
 (0.25
th
 and 0.50
th
) quintile(s) in contemporary 
(non-contemporary) regressions. Corresponding military expenditure thresholds range between 
5.734 and 7.363. Second, in Panel B the unconditional and conditional impacts are consistently 
significant in the 0.25
th
, 0.50
th
 and 0.90
th
 quintiles with corresponding thresholds ranging 
between 4.710 and 6.617. Third, most significant control variables display expected signs.  
5. Concluding implications and future research directions  
Although past studies that have examined the nexus between terrorism and military expenditure 
have concluded that latter the fuels the former (see Sandler, 2005; Lum et al., 2006), others have 
postulated that there is no consensus in the literature that military expenditure devoted to curbing 
terrorism instead fuels terrorism (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010). The purpose of this study was to 
assess thresholds at which military expenditure reduces the effects of capital flight for terrorism. 
Using panel data on 37 African countries from 1996-2010, we examine the issue. The empirical 
evidence was based on: (i) baseline contemporary and non-contemporary OLS, (ii) contemporary 
and non-contemporary fixed effects regressions to account for the unobserved heterogeneity, (iii) 
the Generalised Method of Moments to account for the capital flight trap and (iv) Quantile 
Regressions (QR) to account for initial levels of capital flight. The thresholds are apparent 
exclusively in QR with thresholds ranging from:  4.224 to 5.612 for domestic terrorism, 5.734 to 
7.363 for unclear terrorism and 4.710 to 6.617 for total terrorism. No thresholds are apparent in 
transnational terrorism related regressions. Depending to the terrorism target, the findings 
broadly show that a critical mass of between 4.224 and 7.363 of military expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP is needed to reverse the effect of capital flight for terrorism. Our study 
demonstrated the mere establishment of whether military expenditure increases or decreases 
terrorism is not sufficient to influence more relevant policy. Conversely, establishing thresholds 
at which such military expenditure can dampen terrorism for other macroeconomic outcomes is 
more worthwhile. 
5.1 Contributions to theory and practice  
Regarding further theoretical contributions, the African literature on fighting terrorism has been 
oriented essentially towards investigating the effect of poverty and freedoms on terrorism 
(Barros et al., 2008), examining the role of competition between military companies on the rate 
at which conflicts are brought to a swift end (Akcinaroglu & Radziszewski, 2013), exploring the 
role of institutions such as the African Union (Ewi & Aning, 2006) and assessing the influence 
of geopolitical fluctuations (Straus, 2012).  On the other hand, much of contemporary literature 
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on African capital flight has focused on inter alia, lessons from case studies on the causes and 
effects of capital flight (Ndikumana, 2016) notably: the nexus between fiscal policy and capital 
flight in Kenya (Muchai & Muchai, 2016), determinants of capital flight in Madagascar 
(Ramiandrisoa  &  Rakotomanana, 2016) and Ethiopia (Geda & Yimer, 2016), capital flight and 
trade misinvoicing in Zimbabwe (Kwaramba et al., 2016) and capital flight in Cameroon; 
connections between tax revenue and capital flight in Burkina Faso (Ndiaye & Siri, 2016) and 
the effect of capital flight on public social spending in Congro-Brazzaville (Moulemvo, 2016). 
Our study adds to the growing body of liaterature on African by explicating the thresholds at 
which such military expenditure can dampen terrorism. In this direction, the study also adds to 
theoretical knowledge regarding the nexus between terrorism and military expenditure (Sandler, 
2005). 
From a policy standpoint, the question of whether the military thresholds established in 
this study are achievable, two points are worth elucidating. On the one hand, there is need to 
increase military spending on average terms because the median and mean military expenditures 
as percentages of GDP are respectively 1.582 and 2.156. On the other hand, increasing military 
expenditure would require diverting public spending from other sectors to the military. The risk 
of such diversion is that such incremental spending may be captured by corrupt elite. If this is 
likely to be the case,  then increasing military spending would have unexpected  effects and lead 
to a reduction in general welfare because of inter alia: (i) siphoned funds that would be deposited 
in tax havens abroad is a further indication of capital flight; (ii) terrorism could continue to 
destroy economic infrastructures and  hence increase a negative economic outlook that could 
further fuel capital flight and (iii) the forgone expenditure in welfare projects that is devoted to 
military expenditure may contribute to deteriorating socio-economic conditions needed for 
economic growth and capital inflows.  
To put this another way, it is alleged that more than 50% of Nigeria’s currency reserves 
or 15 billion USD was lost in fraudulent security spending by the government of Goodluck 
Jonathan (Kay, 2016). Within this context, a former Nigerian officer is accused of stealing about 
2 billion USD from funds allocated for the fight against the Boko Haram (Vice News, 2015). As 
in the case of Kenya with the fight against the Al Shabaab, reliance on foreign military aid could 
be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for alleviating the issues highlighted above. Hence, 
good and credible institutions remain essential. Concerning future research, our study indicates 
that future studies can improve extant literature by engaging other policy variables such as 
inclusive development. This is essentially because exclusive development has been documented 
to motivate the Boko Haram insurgency as well as Western-born and educated youths joining the 
ranks of ISIL partly because of feelings of socio-economic exclusion and discrimination 
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(Asongu et al., 2016). Furthermore, replicating this inquiry within country-oriented frameworks 
would provide more targeted policy implications on country-specific military expenditure 
thresholds.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Definition of variables, sources and Summary statistics 
        
 Definitions/ Sources Mean S.D Min Max Obs 
        
 
Capital Flight  
Ln of Capital Flight (constant of 2010), 
Ndikumana & Boyce (2012a).  
9.993 0.806 6.816 12.333 464 
       
Domestic Terrorism Number of Domestic terrorism incidents (in 
Ln), Enders et al. (2011).  
0.453 0.870 0.000 4.488 555 
       
Transnational Terrorism  Number of Transnational terrorism incidents 
(in Ln), Enders et al. (2011). 
0.242 0.536 0.000 3.332 555 
       
Unclear Terrorism  Number of Unclear terrorism incidents (in 
Ln), Enders et al. (2011). 
0.112 0.425 0.000 4.488 555 
       
Total Terrorism  Number of Total terrorism incidents (in Ln), 
Enders et al. (2011). 
0.605 1.000 0.000 4.844 555 
       
Military Expenditure  Military Expenditure  (% of GDP), WDI 2.156 1.565 0.220 17.334 489 
       
Trade  Trade of Goods and Services (% of GDP), 
WDI 
75.890 39.816 17.858 255.015 525 
       
GDP growth Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates 
(annual %), WDI 
4.435 4.661 -17.254 33.629 540 
       
Inflation  Consumer Price Index  (annual %), WDI 74.917 1099.53 -100.00 24411.03 508 
       
Foreign Investment Foreign direct investment net inflows  (% of 
GDP), WDI 
3.994 5.935 -8.629 40.157 405   
       
Non-Conflicts  Politically Stable countries  0.729 0.444 0.000 1.000 555 
       
Non-Oil Non-Petroleum Exporting countries 0.783 0.412 0.000 1.000 555 
        
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations.  Ln: logarithm. 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  
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Appendix 2: Correlation matrix (1996-2010) (Uniform sample size: 405) 
             
Terrorism Non-dummy control variables Dummy control 
variables 
   
Domestic  Transnational  Unclear   Total Trade  GDP 
growth 
Inflation  Foreign 
Investment  
Non-
Conflicts  
Non-
Oil  
Military  
Expenditure 
Capital 
Flight  
 
1.000 0.528 0.451 0.914 -0.185 -0.007 0.024 -0.031 -0.174 -0.245 0.251 0.225 Domestic  
 1.000 0.490 0.751 -0.118 0.007 0.075 -0.021 -0.294 -0.279 0.204 0.233 Transnational  
  1.000 0.631 -0.129 -0.058 0.123 -0.043 -0.112 -0.187 0.188 0.221 Unclear 
   1.000 -0.197 -0.030 0.074 -0.047 -0.259 -0.299 0.288 0.263 Total  
    1.000 0.020 0.115 0.362 0.058 -0.070 0.075 -0.146 Trade  
     1.000 0.038 0.113 0.006 -0.100 -0.042 0.068 GDP growth 
      1.000 0.013 -0.154 -0.104 -0.041 0.203 Inflation 
       1.000 -0.066 -0.125 0.152 -0.102 Foreign 
Investment 
        1.000 0.404 -0.176 -0.049 Non-Conflicts 
         1.000 -0.159 -0.198 Non-Oil 
          1.000 0.004 Military 
Expenditure 
           1.000 Capital Flight  
             
Non-Conflicts: Politically Stable Countries. Non-Oil: Non-Petroleum Countries.  
Correlation matrix based on a  5% critical value (two-tailed) = 0.0975  
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